Emotions and Ethics.

The main aim of this paper is understand the link between emotions and ethical judgments, more specifically how emotions and ethics converge. In order to have such an understanding an understanding of what emotions are need to be provided. This essay will discuss how emotions are related to value. However there are other formulations of emotions such as emotions being related to feelings (Deigh, 17). Other formulations include emotions as attitudes (Deonna & Teroni, 293). In particular this essay will focus on love to demonstrate my argument that emotions and ethics are altered in order to suit different models of ethics. In other words to say for example that anger is an ethical emotion, what seems to be that case is an alteration of what we understand as anger such that it can be argued to be a moral emotion. This point will be demonstrated with love.

Nozick Argues that the nature of emotions dictate how we feel. More specifically emotions seem to have a structure namely, belief, evaluation and a feeling (Nozick, 87). An emotion is the connection between a belief, an evaluation and a feeling, (Nozick, 88). “The simplest connection is when the belief and evaluation give rise to the feeling, when the person is feeling because of his beliefs and evaluations (Nozick, 88). Hence if we change the belief or evaluation we have a different emotion (Nozick. 89). It is not the that we must first know our beliefs and evaluations in order to identify our emotions, for it can be the case that we identify our emotions first and link them to our beliefs and evaluations. (Nozick, 89). However this seems to suggest that emotions therefore have a cognitive component (Nozick, 89).

Nozick gives an account of how emotions can be defective. This depends on whether the belief is false or the evaluation is incorrect or the feeling may be disproportionate with the evaluation of the experience (Nozick, 89). What is meant by the feeling being disproportionate between the evaluation and feeling is that the feeling may be felt is too high or too low, or felt too intensely or less intense relative to the evaluation. To explain this Nozick provides an example of finding a dollar on the floor. One may feel ecstatic, however finding a dollar on the floor upon its evaluation does not mount to something which one should feel ecstatic for. Because finding a dollar on the floor is not a big deal. The value of finding a dollar on the floor should not amount to one feeling ecstatic (Nozick, 89). It however should be proportionate to “the measure of evaluation” (Nozick, 89). This leads to suggest that there is a correlation between evaluation and emotion, such that a certain measure of evaluation leads to a certain type and intensity of emotion. And in the case of being ecstatic because you have found a dollar there is a disproportion and this may be because unconsciously the person sees or evaluates the finding of a dollar with some other evaluation that would be proportionate to feeling ecstatic (Nozick, 89).

Understanding the link between beliefs evaluations and feelings is important, more specifically what we mean by evaluations, Nozick does raise an issue as to whether evaluations are objective in terms of being able to say whether they are true or false and furthermore states that “In that case, we can utilize whatever standards and norms are appropriate for assessing them. Evaluations can be informed, unbiased, supported by reason, justified” (Nozick, 89). They should not just be based on subjective preference. The goal is to have the best standard of evaluations that emotions are based on (Nozick, 90).

However given the subject of the nature of emotions one may want to understand the importance of emotions. We can have pleasurable feelings without the emotions like basking in the sun, the feelings here do not occur as a result of belies or evaluations. (Nozick, 91). Thus the reason why emotions have value is not because an emotionless life would lack feeling, it is because they provide meaning and a way of determining value (Nozick, 91). One may feel the pleasurable sensations of basking in the sun without the pleasurable emotional feeling that may accompany it. However the recollection of such events would not be the same without emotion (Nozick, 91). In the sense that it would be difficult to recollect pleasurable times in times when there is no pleasure. For instance how does one recollect a happy moment without emotion?

Additionally emotions provide a link between mind and body, because emotions cause physiological changes such as an increase heart rate. The integration can be placed as follows. Psychological physical, belief, evaluation and feeling (Nozick, 91). However there is something more closely related to emotions and that is value.

External value can be said to be “our subjective experience or licking of something” emotions help us place or identify value, the emotional response indicates the value of an object whereas an un-emotional response does not (Nozick 91). Furthermore this value can be said to be objective because the value is based on the characteristics of that object. Thus emotions can be said to be a response to value according to Nozick. That is not to say that emotions are a response to value strictly, they can be a response to other things as well, however value is what most strongly dictates what we emotionally respond to.

The reason why this may be so has to do with what value is. Nozick argues that beliefs are to facts, as emotions are to value. More specifically beliefs are a response to non-evaluative beliefs (Nozick 92). Nozick compares the relation between beliefs and facts, and that of emotion and value. Additionally the same way we may have incorrect beliefs by invalid facts. We can have incorrect emotions to values that do not have the value our emotions may indicate that they have (Nozik, 92).

The more intense of emotion we feel towards something the more we value that object can be said to have. By object I speak of anything that has value and brings out an emotional response like an experience or moment where our emotions are engaged. Emotions are an ”Internal psycho-physiological response to the external value” (Nozick, 93). In other words the appropriate emotion and intensity is felt given the certain value of a specific object.

Love according to Nozick can be understood as unity (Nozick, 68). In other words when two individuals love each other they in some way live each for each other, Nozick does not explicitly claim this however what he says is that there is this union whereby the two individuals can be described as a “we” in this sense it can be understood as a new identity (Nozick, 73). When a person whom is part of the “we” feel pain, the loved one whom is also part of the “we” also feels pain, similarly if something bad happens to one so does it occur to the other (Nozick,70). “Your own wellbeing is tied up with that of someone (or something)” (Nozick, 68). This is the basic idea behind what Nozick considers to be love. It is the mutual sharing of an identity.

If we are to use the above analyses of emotions to that of love, it is clear that besides love being the unity of two, the emotion itself of love is can be said to be relative to the value of the other person. If Nozick is correct that an emotion is not merely a belief and an evaluation and a feeling but also our response to value. Then it must be the same for love, that we feel love because we value the other person.

The question of morality comes in however and can be asked in various ways such as: should a loved one be favoured over a stranger? Should a loved one be saved over a stranger? Should wrongs done by a loved one be overlooked such as murder?

These questions aim to raise tension between the concept of love and morality. More than that it aims to show how emotions and morality are made compatible or incompatible which will be discussed later.

The manner by which a person may love another person may be for their characteristics (Nozick, 75). However this would mean that the love formed based on characteristics is conditional for if the characteristics change than so would the love (Nozick, 75). Additionally if a person is to find someone with better characteristics then the love would be diverted to the new person, however this is said to not happen in the case when the “we” is formed (Nozick, 76). And this reason provided is that in the formation of the “we” there is already an investment that exists in the individual and diverting ones love would take a large sum of energy to invest in someone else and be able to reach the same point as the previous relationship. Additionally there is a risk in investing in someone new because there is uncertainty (Nozick, 77). It can be said that two individuals are bound after the formation of the “we” The reason I bring this up is because given the strong bonds of love, does an agent give it up (this investment for the sake of morality)? Or is it unethical to give this investment up in the first place?

Morality can be argued to be un-biased such that no individual is favoured over the others, however when it comes to love there appears to be this favouring of the loved one (Velleman, 338). According to Velleman love is compatible with morality, he argues that for Kantian ethics there is a misunderstanding that equal consideration should be given to all individuals (Velleman, 338). However he argues that it is misunderstood as Kantian ethics does not say that we cannot have interest in one person over the other rather that it amounts to “considering everyone as having equal access to justifications for acting” which means that a person’s interest may not necessarily need to be equal for all but rather “considering everyone’s rights as equal” (Velleman, 340).

However an issue still remains that the agent according to Kantian ethics may need to act in a way that does not favour a loved one (Velleman. 340). Velleman recognises that love and morality can be distinct however he argues that love is a moral emotion. That is because if I understand him he is saying that the essence of love is that of morality. Which means that we should look for a way that love and morality converge (Velleman, 341).

For Freud love can be understood as a drive and more sexual in nature. Loving someone from this perspective is more the case of overvaluing the person. In other words or analogously the person paints a picture of the beloved that is exaggerated and can be said to be an illusion. However this form of love is not argued to be the type of love that is congruent with morality because overvaluing someone places them in ranks that are higher than others (Velleman, 350).

Velleman is speaking of love in the purer sense, like the relations between spouses and friends of which the effects of overvaluation may not be present (Velleman, 350).Taking a form of love that airs on the side of caring (Nozick, 353). However this type of love may be smothering and in a sense interfering (Velleman, 354). This form of love cannot then be a moral emotion because what most characteristics of love have in common is that there is an expectation of a result. The love given is then not love for its own sake “love is likewise the awareness of a value inhering in its object”

Love then according to Velleman is the lowering of our emotional defences, by this happening we are opening ourselves to another individual, as a result we often act benevolently towards the beloved we act for the beloved without the expectation of achieving a goal, and it is done for its own sake (Velleman, 361). By doing so we are recognising value in a person and acting on it.

Comparisons can be drawn here between what Velleman considers as love and what Nozick believes are emotions, both of these models are attached to value. However value from the perspective of Velleman has more to do with value in terms of respect for the person, and the value of which Nozick speaks of is more determined by characteristics of the object.

However attaching love to value can be problematic, simply placed it means that other individuals can be valued over others, it takes away the idea of people being equivalent (Velleman, 363). But this is true if love is based on characteristics. The love that may be more appropriate is the love that loves the person for their true selves or more specifically for their capacity for love (Velleman, 365).

In the case that we love one person over the other Velleman argues that we respond to their value differently but not that we see them as lower value, additionally it could be the case that we do not have a realisation of their value which makes it difficult to lower our emotional defences to that person (Velleman, 372).

The question now can be asked if a person should saved a loved one over a stranger, Velleman cites an example by William of a man who chooses to save his wife over strangers. To understand if this is moral one has to understand the reason behind acting so, the man chooses to save his wife and this is moral because the value is placed on the partnership of the two people and not solely on the wife. This means that he chooses to save her because of the value of the relationship between them and not because he sees her as more valuable as the strangers (Velleman, 373).

However the point still remains that one chose to save a loved one over stranger, the partiality or biasness still exists. However is it still a rational decision? It may very well be a rational decision because your reasons for saving a stranger are: The reasons may be one ought to, it is moral to save someone from harm and so on. Now compare this with the reasons to save a loved one, the reasons would be same as those stated to save a stranger however there is an extra reason namely. You love that person as well. As well as it being a rational decision it is also an emotional decision, a want. If Nozick is correct it is the emotion that compels you to save the one you love. This means that there is value in doing so. However we now have two conceptions of love Velleman and Nozicks. But it is Velleman’s concept of love that is argued to be a moral emotion because what he defines as love is more morally applicable. Velleman even states Nozicks concept of love labelling them among the other theories of love, that they are a form of love that can be understood as an aim (Velleman, 354). That is the beloved is not loved for the sake of the beloved. Velleman’s concept of love may be morally applicable, the issue I wish to raise is that it appears to be an idea of love that is formulated such that it is morally applicable. It is not however looking at what love is as a whole and then analysing to see if it is a moral emotion. The question seems to be changed from “Is love a moral emotion?” to “How can love be a moral emotion?”

He created a type of love that is compatible with what we can say is moral. Analogously it is like placing a missing puzzle piece with a moulded piece of clay. “Love is a moral emotion precisely in the sense that its spirit is closely akin to that of morality. The question, then, is not whether two divergent perspectives can be accommodated but rather how these two perspectives converge” (Velleman, 341). I am not arguing that his concept of love is wrong he does have a strong argument drawing from Kant. But that fact still remains that it could be the case of looking at a portion of love that is applicable to morality.

This seems to be the main way emotions are treated in ethics it is a way of converging emotions and morality. The way this is done seems to be by having an alternate understanding of either the emotion or the way morality is understood. in the case of revenge although revenge is not argued to be moral it is argued to be justified however the manner in which it is justified demonstrates my point “An account of morality needs to be given which shows respect for an act of revenge must necessarily be distinct from moral approval, and indeed needs to be consistent with moral disapproval” (Rosebury, 453). As can be seen in this quote, a different account first needs to be given such that we can have an emotion that is respected morally but not necessarily morally approved of. I am not arguing that emotions are not compatible with morality, however the manner by which emotions are argued to be compatible is by either accepting a certain moral school of thought or an alteration in how we understand certain emotions. There may be no issue at hand with this because what love consists of may be so large that it is not possible to understand it except by placing boundaries so that we may understand love, however this means that there is an inherent concern with emotions because trying to define any emotion has its challenges and its defining characteristics can be widespread such that it is difficult to pinpoint. This means that it is inherently difficult to relate emotion to morality for there can be many concepts of love, anger or revenge and some of those concepts may be morally applicable whereas others may not.

An additional example of this can be seen in the case of contempt “I refer to contempt as an attitude. One might just as easily refer to it as an emotion or feeling. All three terms are fraught, I’m afraid with their own philosophical baggage. “Attitude” best captures, I think, contempt’s quality as a form of regard” (Mason, 239). Here we see an example of this, whereby we see an alteration of how contempt is understood more as an attitude than an emotion. Of course one may have a justified reason for understanding contempt as an attitude. It however does show how the arguments alter certain emotions such that they are made to be understood in a way that is more morally applicable. If we are to take a Freudian account of love which is more sexual and depends on the illusion or image that the beloved has as an effect on the lover, this concept of love may not be compatible ethical theories because it is more egoistic or fails to see the true value of the person and self-centred in nature which seems to violate various ethical theories. The solution then is to have a better or different understanding of love such as Nozick’s or Velleman’s. However a possible objection to this is that by doing so we may very well be missing the essence of what love actually is. Because we seem to be choosing what love is instead of understanding what love is.

The first point of this essay was to demonstrate what emotions are in terms of value, followed by two theories or concepts of love. From this it can be deduced that understanding emotion and relating it to a specific emotion such as love in this case is a complex task. Additionally taking that emotion and relating it morally has its own challenges. The issue stated seems to be that our concepts of what emotions are and the defining characteristics of what specific emotions entail leads us into a complexity that forces us to alter or change perspectives in what we understand as emotions that best suit morality. But by doing so and answering questions of how can a certain emotion be a moral emotion? Instead of asking what a certain emotion is and if it can be related to morality? This seems to force us into a direction that we see the answers we are seeking. We see the answers we are seeking because what love or hate or any emotion for that matter actually is may be so broad that we are bound to find an answer within it that satisfies our question of relating an emotion to morality. I am not arguing an epistemological problem I am however saying that we seem to be implicitly answering the question of how can a certain emotion can be a moral emotion instead of whether it is a moral emotion.